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NOTES

Command of Sovereignty Gives Way to
Concern for Humanity
ABSTRACT

This Note examines the legality of humanitarian intervention by tracing the historicaljustificationsfor nonintervention through modern interpretations of the U.N. Charter. Events leading to the change in the
U.N. stance on humanitarianintervention are discussed. The Note also
sets out criteriafor justifiable intervention. The Note concludes that intervention can be justified to the extent that it is carriedoutfor humanitarianpurposes.
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INTRODUCTION

States, scholars, and the United Nations itself have long interpreted
the United Nations Charter to prohibit foreign intervention in a state's
internal affairs.' In 1992, however, the United Nations (U.N.) approved
the United States military efforts to bring humanitarian relief to Somalia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina.' This policy reversal reflects recent world
events that have changed the way the international community views
human rights. As the threat of superpower confrontation diminishes, the
rights of individuals to live free from oppression, discrimination, and
persecution eclipse other international concerns. 3 Although the number
of interstate conflicts is waning, intrastate conflicts are increasing. Internal disputes are erupting in warfare as traditional forms of government
lose popular support.4 Unlike the victims of most interstate wars, the

victims of the conflicts in places such as Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are civilians who must struggle to survive the battles that will deter-

1.

F.X. DE LIMA, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (1971) (citing U.N.

efforts to codify the principle of nonintervention).
2. See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
3. George Bush, Address to the 46th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City (Sept. 23, 1991), in 27 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL
DOCUMENTS 1324, 1325 [hereinafter U.N. Address].
4.

Iraq is perhaps the most visible example in modern times. In the aftermath of the

U.N.-backed coalition's intervention to remove Iraqi soldiers from Kuwait, rebel armies
attempted to overthrow Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Hussein quashed the revolts.
The brutal response to Kurdish insurrection caused some two million Kurds to flee to the
mountains of northwestern Iraq. Howard G. Chua-Eoan, Defeat and Flight, TIME, Apr.
15, 1991, at 18; George J. Church, The Course of Conscience, TIME, Apr. 15, 1991, at
28. Saddam Hussein has gone to great extremes, including using poisonous gas, to quash
rebellion. See The Noose Tightens, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 25, 1991, at 18-20; Patrick E.

Tyler, 'Clean Win' in the War with Iraq Drifts into a Bloody Aftermath, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 1991, at 1.

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

1993]

mine the form and personality of the government under which they will
live."
As the international community witnesses civilian suffering, it demands that states such as the United States intervene. 6 For reasons one
time vital to the preservation of international order, international law
prohibits intervention forceful enough to provide food and other nonmilitary assistance.' Despite this historical rejection of humanitarian intervention as a justification for using force against a state, however, the
U.N. has sanctioned limited interventions in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina for the sole purpose of preserving human life.'
This Note examines the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and
considers the factors underlying the international community's shift in
attitude regarding the validity of such intervention. The Note then explores the U.N.'s history of nonintervention. It examines the controversy
in the U.N. surrounding this change in attitude and the recent reinterpretation of the United Nations Charter (Charter) to allow armed intervention to reduce human suffering. Finally, this Note examines the
United States potential role as guardian of human rights in the "new
world order."
II.

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: DEFINITION AND HISTORICAL
APPROACH

Under the theory of humanitarian intervention, a state may intervene
in the internal affairs of another state if the government of the target
state severely deprives its citizens of their basic human rights.9 The doc5. Sophronia S. Gregory, How Somalia Crumbled, TIME, Dec. 14, 1992, at 34, 34;
War in Bosnia-Hercegovinais Yugoslavia's Worst Nightmare Come True, OTTAWA
CITIZEN, Apr. 26, 1992, at A3.

6. See Sadruddin Aga Khan, Help Iraq Help its People, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,1991,
at 19; Peter Maass, Relief Supplies Won't Prevent Bosnia Tragedy, U.N. Aide Says,
WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1993,' at A13.
7.

See U.N.

CHARTER

art. 2,

7.

8. Paul Lewis, Mission to Somalia: Painting Nations Blue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,
1992, at A17 (describing U.N. intervention in Somalia); Moslems Lay Down Ultimatum
at Peace Talks, While Shells Hit Sarajevo, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 4, 1993
(describing the situation in Bosnia and U.N. involvement there) [hereinafter Moslems
Lay Down Ultimatum].

9. ANN VAN WYMEN THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., NON-INTERVENTION 71
FERNANDO R. TEs6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO
LAW AND MORALITY 5 (1988); see also HENRY G. HODGES, THE DOCTRINE OF IN-

(1956);

1 (1915) (defining intervention as "an interference by a state or states in
the external affairs of another without its consent, or in its internal affairs with or without its consent").
TERVENTION
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trine is a largely dormant, historically disfavored, and morally based
principle of international law.'0 States generally do not consider this doctrine to be a legal basis for using force against another state." Moreover,
there is no consensus among states that adhere to the doctrine on what
actions the doctrine allows."2
The question of what intervention allows is the basis of the conflict
surrounding the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. One one side is
the belief that intervention can never be legal,' 3 while on the other side is
the growing concern for human rights and the desirability of legal intervention when violations reach a level that incites moral outrage. 4
III.

CHANGING VIEWS ON THE DOCTRINE OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION

A. The Dispute over HumanitarianIntervention
Despite its disputed status, however, the legal doctrine of humanitarian intervention has a long and extensively documented history. 5 Early

Humanitarian intervention can be defined as the right of one state to exercise international control over the acts of another when the target state acts contrary to the laws of
humanity. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra, at 372. It is also defined as "the reliance upon
force for the justifiable purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another state from treatment which is so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits of that authority within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice." ELLERY C.
STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (1921).
10. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 9, at 61 (asserting nonintervention is preferred
over intervention); TES6N, supra note 9, at 111 (discussing the moral implications of the
doctrine); H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 32 (1950)
(describing the use of the doctrine as sporadic and infrequent and casting doubt on its
recognition in international law).
11. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 10, at 33. States tend to rely on other justifications
for intervention that is humanitarian in nature. Id.
12. The doctrine's precarious standing may be partially attributable to the lack of
agreement on how to define "intervention." It has been defined as "when a state or
group of states interferes, in order to impose its will, in the internal or external affairs of
another state, sovereign and independent, with which peaceful relations exist and without
its consent, for the purpose of maintaining or altering the condition of things." THOMAS
& THOMAS, supra note 9, at 71. Another scholar interprets intervention to mean "proportionate transboundary help, including forcible help, provided by governments to individuals in another State who are being denied basic human rights and who themselves
would be rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive government." TES6N, supra
note 9, at 5.
13. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 9, at 74.

14.

See TEs6N, supra note 9, at 15.

15.

See STOWELL, supra note 9, at 55-62;.LAUTERPACHT, supra note 10, at 33;
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international law scholars considered all states equal and therfore intervention by one state into another was impermissible. 6 Eventually scholars accepted that there are limits to a state's power to act in a manner
that denies its citizens fundamental human rights to an extent that
shocks the conscience." 7 In theory, at least, international scholars recognized the validity of intervention based on the breach of these limits. 8
States have not justified intervention with the need to rectify human
rights violations because of their belief that relying on human rights

abuses as a justification for intervention would upset an otherwise peaceful climate.' 9
Humanitarian intervention's potential for abuse is the basis of one of
its criticisms.2 0 Critics believe that once humanitarian causes become accepted bases for armed intervention in the affairs of states, illegitimate

TES6N, supra note 9, at 15; LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 347 (1905).
Oppenheim asserts:
Should a state venture to treat its own subjects or a part thereof with such cruelty
as would stagger humanity, public opinion of the rest of the world would call
upon the powers to exercise intervention for the purpose of compelling such a state
to establish a legal order of things within its boundaries sufficient to guarantee to
its citizens an existence more adequate to the idea of modern civilization.
Id.; see also HODGES, supra note 9. "It is generally agreed that should the offense be
continued, and be of such a nature as to shock all national morality, then an intervention
may be permissible if an occasion should arise that would make it possible for this intervention to accomplish positive good." Id. at 87-88.
16. DE LIMA, supra note 1, at 11. "[T]o intermediate in the domestic affairs of another nation or to undertake to constrain its councils is to do it an injury." Id. at 12
(quoting E. Vattel).
17. See HODGES, supra note 9, at 90. "[A]ny Sovereign may justly take up arms to
chastise nations which are guilty of enormous faults against the laws of nature." Id. at
90 n.29 (quoting Hugo Grotius).
18. Id. at 90.
19. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 10, at 32. Lauterpacht criticizes this position on the
grounds that "peace is more endangered by tyrannical contempt for human rights than
by attempts to assert, through intervention, the sanctity of human personality." Id.
20. See Conference Proceedings (revised transcript of the March 11-12, 1972 Conference by the Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute on "Humanitarian Intervention Through the United Nations") [hereinafter Conference Proceedings], in HuMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973)
[hereinafter HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION]; Ian Brownlie, Thoughts on KindHearted Gunmen, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 139, 147. "Humanitarian inter-

on the basis of all available definitions, would be an instrument wide open to
abuse." Id. at 146. Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect
vention,

Human Rights: Recent Views from the United Nations, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 197, 218-20; Paul A. Neuland, Traditional Doctrine on Intervention in the Law of
Nations 190 (1971) (Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University).
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meddling will begin to be labeled "humanitarian."'" Safeguards against
abuse, however, are available. Intervention through collective action
would minimize the risk of abuse.22 If collective action is impossible and
the only alternative is unilateral action, 23 many critics would urge nonrecognition of the doctrine. Recent changes in the U.N.'s political status,
24
however, have made collective action a valuable possiblity.
The U.N. traditionally promoted and conformed to nonintervention
principles.25 For example, the U.N.'s Declaration of Non-Intervention, 2
promulgated in 1965, emphasizes the right of states to choose and oper-

ate their government without external interference. The declaration explicitly forbids intervention that threatens the sovereignty and political

21. Conference Proceedings, supra note 20, at 81-83 (discussing the problem of the
superpowers intervening at their discretion and justifying it later). Humanitarian concerns have been used to justify questionable actions such as the United States involvement in the Dominican Republic and the U.S.S.R.'s intervention in Czechoslovakia.
Fonteyne, supra note 20, at 218; Conference Proceedings, supra note 20, at 81-82; DE
LIMA, supra note 1,at 49.
22. Collective action currently means action that occurs under the auspices of the
United Nations. One example is the multistate intervention in Korea. See Michael J.
Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention in Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 547, 602 (1987); cf.Jean-Pierre
L. Fonteyne, The Customary InternationalLaw Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter,4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203, 226-27
(1974) [hereinafter Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention] (arguing multilateral action
is not a practical remedy).
23. Conference Proceedings, supra note 20, at 33 (explaining the view that the
Charter's prohibition of unilateral force is a necessary corollary to the U.N.'s primary
goal of maintaining international peace); see also Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention, supra note 22, at 246-47, BELATCHEW ASRAT, PROHIBITION OF FORCE UNDER
THE U.N. CHARTER: A STUDY OF ART. 2(4), at 186 (1991).
24. Conference Proceedings, supra note 20, at 85. "[I]f
we limit humanitarian intervention to global organizational intervention or its equivalent, then we are not talking
about a real world. I don't think we can expect the United Nations to intervene actively
through the use of force except in the most limited circumstances." Id.
25. DE LIMA, supra note 1, at 53-63.
While the [United Nations] has made numerous representations in human rights
matters and has influenced decision by a variety of indirect modalities, it has undertaken direct or delegated use of the military instrument in the territory of a
State only when public order either had disintegrated or 'was about to disintegrate
into a state of violent anarchy in which no human rights could be sustained.
Michael Reisman, A HumanitarianIntervention to Protect to Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION, supra note 20, at 167, 184.
26. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of

States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N.
GAOR, 20th Sess., 1408th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 14 (1965) [hereinafter Declaration].
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independence of states."
Consequently, any armed intervention on behalf of human rights, no
matter how commendable, inexcusably violates the principle of complete
governmental autonomy.2" Prohibition of armed intervention to preserve
human rights or end human rights violations is a dear and simple rule.
The international community resists deviation from the rule of nonintervention because exceptions might 29"erode psychological constraints on the
use of force for other purposes. "
For decades the policy of nonintervention has been vital to the maintenance of virtual world peace.3 0 The desirability of this policy has diminished in the current climate of democratic revolution because it seems
inconsistent that "though states are founded for the sake of life and liberty, they cannot be challenged in the name of life and liberty."3 " International law, however, exists not to promote one type of government over
another nor to protect the rights of individuals, but rather to protect the
rights of legitimate governments.3 2 The current trend toward democratization may alter this perspective, but only if the general aversion to using force for any reason other than defense substantially diminishes.
B.

A Modern Outlook

Recent events have created an awareness that only force can stop some
serious human rights violations. Modern international law scholars likewise are beginning to acknowledge the necessity of intervention.3 3 Principles that place the individual on equal footing with the state, rather than
34
as a subject to its complete power, are garnering increasing support.
27. The Declaration states that "[n]o State has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal and external affairs of any other
State." Id.
28. Neuland, supra note 20, at 193; Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention, supra

note 22, at 248; THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 9, at 67.
29. Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention, supra note 22, at 248; see also TES6N,
supra note 9, at 163.

30.

Donald C. Watt, Keeping the PeacelU.N. New World Order?Just Too Many

Scores to Settle, THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 6, 1992, at 12.
31. TEs6N, supra note 9, at 24 (quoting MICHAEL WALTZER,
WARS

JUST AND UNJUST

61 (1977)).

32. Id. Consequently, international law protects a totalitarian regime under which
the individual has no right of liberty. The individual is merely a component of a class
with certain privileges that the state may revoke at will. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra
note 9, at 358.

33.

TEs6N,

supra note 9, at 5.

34. Id. at 7. As one scholar predicted in 1950, "as the feeling of general interest in
humanity increases, and with it a world-wide desire for something approaching justice
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Concerns for the rights of individuals are beginning to displace concerns
for the protection of the sovereign. 3"
The recent rise in democratic revolutions helps to explain the change
in attitude toward armed humanitarian intervention. 6 In a democracy, a7
3
state's people create a government for their own benefit and protection.
Thus, a sovereign derives its rights from its citizens and has no separate
identity.38 If a sovereign fails to fulfill its obligations to its citizens, it
forfeits its status as a legitimate government and thereby forfeits the pro-

tection of international law.3" This reasoning is a variation on the historical consensus that when a state exceeds all reasonable limits on its authority, intervention becomes permissible.40
As society's expections regarding states' treatment of their citizens rise,
international law must adjust accordingly. The traditional obligations of
sovereignty must evolve to include a commitment to upholding basic
human rights and an accountability for violations of those rights. Moreover, as the traditional ideals of nonintervention cease to satisfy societal
expectations of international law, nonintervention must evolve into a
more flexible doctrine. Circumstances that dictate this shift are the increased awareness of conditions around the world and the increasing cer-

and an international solidarity, interventions undertaken in the interests of humanity will
also doubtless increase." HODGES, supra note 9, at 91. Furthermore, "future public
opinion, and finally international law will sanction an ever increasing number of causes
for intervention for the sake of humanity, where that cause is made the object of collective action on the part of a number of the larger powers." Id.
35. See, e.g., Landscape of Death, TIME, Dec. 14, 1992, at 30. "The harrowing
faces of starvation, the inert shapes of death. These are images that have finally brought
the world to Somalia's rescue." Id.
36. HODGES, supra note 9, at 91.
37. TEs6N, supra note 9, at 15. "From an ethical standpoint governments are, internationally and domestically, mere agents of the people. Consequently, their international
rights derive from the rights of the individuals who inhabit and constitute the state." Id.

at 111.
38. Id. at 16. Government control stems from people's giving up some of their rights
in exchange for social order. Thus, if the government does not respect its citizens' rights,
it loses its legitimacy and essentially its rights as a sovereign. Id. at 112.
39. Id. at 113. Tes6n notes:
[Blecause the ultimate justification of the existence of states is the protection and
enforcement of the natural rights of the citizens, a government that engages in
substantial violations of human rights betrays the very purpose for which it exists
and so forfeits not only its domestic legitimacy, but its international legitimacy as
well.
Id. at 15; see also David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian
Intervention, 23 U. TOL. L. REv. 253, 260 (1992).
40. See HODGES, supra note 9, at 88.
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tainty of humanitarian intervention's success, which is generally assumed
when one of the major international powers participates. 4
IV.

LEGITIMATE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

A. Background of Nonintervention and the United Nations Charter
Many states in the international community adhere to the policy of
nonintervention, and they find support for this position in their reading
of the U.N. Charter.4 2 The doctrine of nonintervention, like the U.N.
itself, developed out of principles of self-determination, choice of internal
organization, and independence. 43 In theory, in order for states to develop their chosen forms of government, the international community not
only had to discourage but also had to prohibit intervention.44 Consistent
with this belief, the majority of states consider the U.N.'s purpose to be
maintaining international peace and security through restraint of intervening actions against states that satisfy a minimal standard of public
order and human rights protections.45 Members of the U.N., consequently, have interpreted the Charter in a manner based on the premise
46
of virtual nonintervention in states' internal affairs.

A strict construction of the Charter permits the use of force in only
two situations: self-defense and maintenance of international peace and
security.4 7 Article 2(4) requires states to refrain from using force to in41. See Strobe Talbott, Dealing with Anti-Countries, TIME, Dec. 14, 1992, at 35
(reporting that media coverage was the catalyst for action in Somalia.). Humanitarian
intervention is generally only considered an option if success is certain. HODGES, supra
note 9, at 88.
42. DE LIMA, supra note 1, at 53-63. De Lima "trace[s] the various developments
emanating from the efforts of the international community to come to grips with the
principle of non-intervention-the antithesis of intervention." Id. at 53.
43. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 9, at 14; see also Neuland, supra note 20, ai
99, 105-10. "A basic tenet of international law is the right of independence, internal and
external; and as a consequence of internal independence a state must be free to manage
its domestic affairs as it sees fit, subject to no interference from other states except to the
extent to which international law binds it." THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 9, at 359.

44. DE LIMA, supra note 1, at 13.
45. Fonteyne, supra note 20, at 219 ("Consciously sacrificing the alternative Charter
goal of justice and promotion of even minimal human rights to the overriding concern for
minimum public order, equated with sheer avoidance of forceful interactions in international relations, they try to fill all possible gaps in the system of Charter restrictions on
forceful state initiatives.)."
46. See Watt, supra note 30, at 12 (describing the success of U.N. nonintervention
policy).
47. Tus6N, supra note 9, at 128; Conference Proceedings, supra note 20, at 43;
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terfere with "territorial integrity" or "political independence," and from
using force in a "manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations."4' 8 Article 51 permits the use of force when a state acts in selfdefense or in response to threats to international peace and security. 9 In
further support of nonintervention, article 2(7) states that nothing in the
Charter authorizes the U.N. to intervene in matters "essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction" of a state.5
The Declaration of Non-Intervention reinforces the traditional noninterventionist interpretation of the Charter." This document specifically
provides that no state has the right to intervene in another state's affairs
for any reason.5 2 States that voted for the resolution, some scholars argue, were consenting to an interpretation of articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the
53
Charter that completely prohibits intervention.
The obvious and unfortunate effect of this strict construction is that it
prevents the U.N. from acting to protect individuals from human rights
abuses if a government chooses to repress its own citizens as a means of
maintaining power and internal order. For many years, however, the
U.N. has accepted armed humanitarian intervention in. situations where
human rights violations have attained such a level of severity that the
U.N.'s Security Council asserts a need to act in order to preserve international peace and security. 4 In 1965, for example, the U.N. authorized
intervention in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) when authorities in Southern
Rhodesia proclaimed independence and the General Assembly believed
that the proclamation would result in the continued denial of basic

Fonteyne, supra note 20, at 199-200.
48. U.N. CHARTER. art. 2, 4.
49. The U.N. Charter provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Id. art. 51.
50. Id. art. 2(7); see Scheffer, supra note 39, at 261.
51. Declaration,supra note 26; Conference Proceedings, supra note 20, at 43.
52. Declaration, supra note 26 ("No State has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly; for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other
State.").
53. Conference Proceedings, supra note 20, at 43.
54. Id. at 27; Reisman, supra note 25, at 188.
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human rights to the Native African majority. 5 The Security Council
called upon all states to refuse recognition of the Rhodesian Government's illegal authority.56 It further resolved that the United Kingdom
should put 'an end to the situation. The U.N. justified these actions on
the ground that the situation in Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security. 51 Similarly, in 1991, the U.N. found the conflict in Somalia to be a threat to international peace and security despite
the fact that the dispute did not cross the borders of any state.5 9 The
threat justified "legal" armed intervention because the sole objective was
saving human life.
A state acting without the U.N.'s permission or approval can justify
an act of armed humanitarian intervention only by claiming self-defense.6 0 The "self-defense" claim may be expanded theoretically to include altruistic action taken by one state on behalf of another in order to
restore world order.61 This approach allows the doctrine of humanitarian intervention to comport with presently acceptable theories of international law.
B.

Restructuring the Interpretation of the United Nations Charter

Many scholars are suggesting, and the U.N. itself is considering, loosening the tight restrictions on use of force.62 A different interpretation of

55. Myers S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 Am.J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1968).
56. Id.
57. 10 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS: SERIES 1, 48 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed.,
1989).
58. Id.
59.

Lewis, supra note 8, at A17 (reporting that the Security Council declared that

"the human tragedy caused by the conflict of Somalia" by itself was a threat to interna-

tional peace and security); see also Christopher Greenwood, Allies Invoke Unwritten
Rule to Back Action, THE TIMES (London), Jan. 9, 1993 (reporting that resolution 688
declared the situation in Iraq a threat to international peace and security).
60. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter excepts from the restriction on the use of force the
"right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member." U.N. CHARTER art. 51; Neuland, supra note 20, at 84; TES6N, supra note 9, at
128.
61. Neuland, supra note 20, at 130-31. This position equates intervention to preserve the sovereignty of a member of international society with an action by a state to
preserve its own sovereignty. Id. at 131.
62. See TEs6N, supra note 9, at 130-37 (interpreting the U.N. Charter as including
protection of human rights as a primary goal); Fonteyne, supra note 20, at 213 (arguing
that the Charter's prohibition of force should not apply to case of gross human rights
violations).
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the U.N. Charter maintains considerable restraint on the use of force but
does not limit armed intervention for humanitarian purposes to the most
extreme cases of human rights violations. Viewing the Charter in light of
both of its stated purposes, the prevention of international warfare and
the protection of human rights, this interpretation facilitates these
goals. 3 The traditional strict interpretation of nonintervention, however,
serves only the Charter's first purpose. It demands that states, as well as
the U.N., resort to force only in response to aggression and only when
peace and security are in jeopardy.6 4 Adherence to this mandate, however, often precludes enforcement of the second stated purpose, the protection of human rights.
Some scholars argue that the two purposes are not inconsistent because the Charter's nonintervention principles were never intended to
apply in the area of human rights violations. 65 By ratifying the U.N.
Charter states undertook commitments, enforceable by the U.N., to
human rights.6 6 Other scholars urge that there is no inconsistency in the
two purposes because the Charter is a living document and construing it
in accordance with present purposes and expectations of the international community permits intervention to protect human rights. State
practices that violate human rights, including genocide, apartheid, and
racial discrimination, must find no shield in nonintervention principles.6 "
The provisions in the U.N. Charter regarding human rights allow for
sanctioning armed intervention for humanitarian purposes.6 9 The Preamble of the Charter states that one of the organization's goals is to
"reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations
large and small."' 70 The Preamble also provides that armed force shall

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Conference Proceedings, supra note 20, at 60; see U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
Fonteyne, supra note 20, at 206-09.
Id. at 200 (citing commentary of U.N. delegates as support for his arguments).
TES6N, supra note 9, at 134-47.

68, Fonteyne, supra note 20, at 207-08.
69. Thomas G. Weiss, New Challengesfor U.N. Military Operations:Implementing
an Agenda for Peace, 16 WASH. Q. 15 (1993). "As efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Somalia, and Iraq illustrate, humanitarianism has made its appearance as the driving
rationale behind new international military forces. The precedent of human rights is
therefore critical in looking toward future U.N. military efforts." Id.
70. U.N. CHARTER pmbl. % 1. Consistently with this statement and its purpose of
protecting human rights, the U.N. has taken considerable action on behalf of the individual. DE LIMA, supra note 1, at 153.
The U.N. has also fulfilled its duty as required under the Charter to promote
human rights by the adoption of: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the

1993]

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

only be used if it is in the "common interest."' This phrase can be
interpreted to mean interests that are "common to all individuals on
earth," as opposed to all recognized governments. 2 Under this interpretation, the use of force is justifiable and follows the mandate of the U.N.
when it is necessary to protect human rights."
Furthermore, article 2(7) leaves room for armed humanitarian intervention. It states that the Charter does not authorize the U.N. to intervene in essentially domestic matters."' The word "intervene" may be interpreted quite literally to prohibit all types of interference in matters of
domestic jurisdictions. 75 Prohibited intervention would then include creating committees and making recommendations on issues. 6 In practice,

the U.N. often involves itself without objection in the peaceful resolution
of domestic concerns.7 In the alternative, intervention could be construed
as any action taken by force or threat of force. 7 This position is also not
accepted in practice7 9 The definition of intervention arguably evolves as
attitudes evolve and varies depending on the interests in conflict. In the
current international climate, however, interpreting article 2(7) to accommodate the new concern for human rights is legitimate and proper."
two Draft Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights; the 1948 Convention on the prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide; and the 1954 Convention on the Political Rights of Women, to
mention a few.
Id.
71. U.N. CHARTER pmbl. 1.
72. TEs6N, supra note 9, at 133.
73. Reisman, supra note 25, at 177.

74. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 17.
75. DE LiMA, supra note 1, at 175-76.
76. Id.
77. THOMAS &

9, at 68.

78. U.N.

supra note 1, at 176-77 (placing an item on

THOMAS, supra note
CHARTER art. 33; DE LIMA,

the General Assembly's agenda clearly is not considered a prohibited form of intervention
under article 35). The U.N. also intervenes in passive ways. "It is generally agreed,
[based on the drafting history of the Charter, and its] provisions of human rights that
when there is a grave violation of basic human rights the U.N. is legally permitted to
discuss, investigate and make recommendations." Id. at 181.
79. See Rajiv Tiwari, United Nations: Assembly Approves Humanitarian

"Supremo" Post, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 19, 1991 [hereinafter "Supremo" Post]. If
intervention were considered prohibited only when force is used, third world states would
not protest the creation of a post whose only authority is to provide aid. They protest

because the coordinator may act without the consent of the state to whom aid is being
provided which they consider impermissible intervention. Id.; see also infra notes 165-84
and accompanying text.
80. See Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention, supra note 22, at 241.
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Article 2(7), furthermore, uses the adjective "essentially" to modify
domestic matters in which the U.N. is precluded from intervening. 8 Use
of this subjective term, rather than a word such as "solely" may support
the notion of nonintervention and qualify the scope of U.N. authority. 2
If a state invoked this interpretation, however, the U.N. would be paralyzed in almost all matters.8" Given the U.N. members' goals, it seems
unlikely that they intentionally provided for the U.N.'s complete removal
from the very disputes it was designed to remedy.
Under traditional Charter interpretation, while the U.N. promotes
human rights, it cannot implement laws to protect them or to punish
their violation. 4 As one scholar has written, under traditional interpretation the U.N. only has "techniques ... to shame states which indulge

in substantial and obvious transgressions of human rights rules."8 " This
shame has limited effect on the government and offers no respite for the
victims of the oppression. By legitimating humanitarian intervention, the
U.N. would enable itself to act on behalf of the rights of individuals,
even if the only threat to peace is the threat to the internal peace of a
single state.
A more narrow reading of the second provision at issue, article 2(4),"8
which prohibits the use of force in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter, also allows armed humanitarian intervention.
Strictly read, article 2(4) prohibits the use of force in only three situations, none of which are characteristic of humanitarian intervention."
First, article 2(4) forbids the use of force to impair the territorial integrity of the target state.88 Humanitarian intervention does not result in a
territorial conquest, but rather in restoring the people's rights.8" Second,

81.

U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7.
THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 9, at 144.
83. DE LIMA, supra note 1, at 216. By asserting that a matter brought to the attention of the General Assembly is of a domestic nature and that the state does not desire
assistance, a state may prevent the U.N. from requiring it to comply with any peaceful
resolution. This occurred when the U.N. began investigating reports of the Iraqi government's alleged use of chemicals against its Kurdish citizens. Iraq was able to halt the
investigations by asserting that it was a matter of domestic jurisdiction. A Welcome In-

'82.

fringement on Sovereignty, STAR TRIB., Dec. 27, 1991, at Al0.
84. Jack Donnelly, Human Rights, HumanitarianIntervention and American Foreign Policy: Law, Morality and Politics, 37 J. INT'L AFF. 311 (1984).
85.

Id. at 337. The ability to mobilize world opinion may also be considered one of

the United Nations strengths. Watt, supra note 30, at 12.
86. See TES6N, supra note 9, at 130.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 131. See generally Fonteyne, supra note 20, at 214-15.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4; TEs6N, supra note 9, at 131.
TEs6N, supra note 9, at 131. Legitimate humanitarian intervention is motivated
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force is prohibited if it affects political independence. 9 Again, a true act
of humanitarian intervention is intended to protect the people of a state,
not to overthrow the government.9 ' Finally, force is not permitted if its
goal frustrates U.N. purposes. 2 Because an enumerated purpose of the
U.N. is the protection of human rights, the Charter does not prohibit
intervention to protect human rights. Moreover, applying traditional textualist interpretation, if the drafters had intended to prohibit all "transboundary force," they would have used language sufficiently specific to
accomplish that goal.9 3
The notion that states should stand silent and impotent to the heinous
treatment of individuals simply because the abuse comes from the people's own government is no longer acceptable. Heightened awareness of
the value of the individual, coupled with the technology that makes specifically targeted intervention possible, allows society "to fulfill the U.N.

Charter's ambition of working to save succeeding generations from the
scourge of war, to reaffirm . . . the dignity and worth of the human

person, in the equal rights of men and women and nations large and
small to promote social progress and better standard of life in larger
freedom."' 94 The achievement of these goals depends on heightened accountability of governments and a greater license for U.N. action to protect human rights.
C.

Criteriafor Intervention

To implement a workable humanitarian intervention policy, states
must establish criteria by which to measure the legitimacy of intervention.9 5 Scholars have suggested certain requirements for legitimate humanitarian intervention, including: disinterestedness of the intervenor;
egregious human rights violation; consent; limited amount of force and
duration; preference for collective action; and exhaustion of other
remedies.

only by the international community's desire to end human suffering or restore human
rights, not by a state's desire to conquer land area. See id.
90.

U.N.

CHARTER

art. 2 (4).

91. TES6N, supra note 9, at 131. It is questionable, however, whether there actually
can be intervention to preserve life that does not favor one government over another.
92.

Id.; U.N.

CHARTER

art. 1.

93. TES6N, supra note 9, at 130-31.
94. U.N. Address, supra note 3, at 1325.
95. Conference Proceedings, supra note 20, at 75-135; Scheffer, supra note 39, at

286 (setting forth question for formulating criteria).
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1. Disinterestedness of the Intervenor
It is essential that an intervening state have little or no ulterior political motive for its intervention. 6 Scholars recognize the unlikelihood of a
military action based purely on humanitarian notions and, therefore,
suggest that so long as the principal reason for the intervention is the
protection of human rights, the intervention will be valid.17 There are
obvious pragmatic problems of attempting to discern a state's true motives for intervening. General sympathy for a cause will help to remove
the taint of politics, whereas an absence of sympathy will produce severe
criticism and fuel political speculation. 8
Consideration of several factors in a postintervention review will assist
in determining the morality of the intervention:
(a) Did troops occupy the territory longer than necessary?
(b) Has the intervenor demanded favors from the new government?
(c) Did the intervenor seek to control the target state in ways unrelated to
humanitarian concerns?
(d) Has there been a restoration of human rights?99

Moreover, the importance of sanctioning humanitarian intervention may
outweigh concerns about the intervenor's political motivations. If the outcome is universally desirable, then it is irrelevant whether a state is intervening in its own interest. 100
2.

Egregious Human Rights Violation

States generally agree that only the most severe situations justify
armed intervention. 10 1 The requirement of severity helps to assure the
validity of the action and protects less powerful states.1 0° This limitation,
however, does not answer the question of what human rights violations
96. TES6N, supra note 9, at 115; Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, supra
note 22, at 235, 261; Bazyler, supra note 22, at 602; R. George Wright, A Contemporary Theory of HumanitarianIntervention, 4 FLA. INT'L L.J. 435, 459 (1989).
97. Bazyler, supra note 22, at 602.
98. Wright, supra note 96, at 459-60. One way to assure disinterestedness is through
the use of collective action. Collective action sacrifices the efficiency of unilateral action
but is likely to result in a higher percentage of morally justified interventions. Doctrine of
HumanitarianIntervention, supra note 22, at 228; Bazyler, supra note 22, at 604; see
also infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.

99. TEs6N, supra note 9, at 115.
100.
101.
note 22,
102.

Wright, supra note 96, at 460-61.
Bazyler, supra note 22, at 598; Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention, supra
at 235, 259; Wright, supra note 96, at 461.
Bazyler, supra note 22, at 598.
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warrant intervention."0 3 At one end of the spectrum, intervention would
be allowed only in those situations where mass killing has occurred or is
imminent. 0 4 At the other extreme, intervention would be allowed any
time a government threatened any basic civil or political right.' 0 5 A balancing approach would determine the extent of permissible intervention
based on the extent of harm suffered.' 0 6
3.

Consent

The term consent applies to the general consent of people being
helped, not the consent of the sovereign.10 7 If the people of a state generally consent to their own government, intervention merely substitutes another state's judgment for that of its citizens.' 018 One scholar broadens
this concept by noting that while the people should consent, they may
have been tortured into such a state of submission that they have lost
their rationality and will to defy the government.' 0 9 Therefore, the condition of being willing to revolt against the government must be qualified
with a rationality requirement.'"
Scholars who consider the sovereign's consent desirable recognize the
precarious nature of such a requirement."' Consent of the target government may be a preferential criterion for armed intervention, but the ab103.

In Somalia in 1992 the civilian population died from starvation and brutality at

a rate of 1000 people a day. Bruce W. Nelan, Taking on the Thugs, TIME, Dec. 14,
1992, at 26-27. Bosnian health and security officials reported in January 1993 that
129,307 people, 12,894 of whom were children, have died or disappeared since the fighting began. Moslems Lay Down Ultimatum, supra note 8.

104. Bazyler, supra note 22, at 598. Bazyler would not allow intervention in cases of
extreme torture but would allow it if killing was imminent. Id. at 600; Conference Proceedings, supra note 20, at 49. This author would require a "widespread loss of hurhan
life." Id.
105. TEs6N, supra note 9, at 117.
106. Id. at 116; see also Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention, supra note 22, at
258. "The seriousness of the reaction against human rights abuses must be proportionate
both to the gravity of the abuses and to the probability of remedying the situation."
TEs6N, supra note 9, at 116.
107. TES6N, supra note 9, at 120; Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention, supra
note 22, at 235; see, e.g., Nelan, supra note 103, at 27 (reporting that the U.N. intervention in Somalia is the first ever undertaken without even pro forma permission).
108. TEs6N, supra note 9, at 119-20.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 119-21.
111. Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention, supra note 22, at 268. Invalid consent
may be expressed in a case where intervention is not truly warranted; conversely, where
a significant number of human beings are in grave danger, intervention should not be
precluded by lack of consent. Id.
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sence of consent should not bar intervention when the other criteria have
been met.112 A variation on this approach is to require that the intervenor receive an invitation from someone, whether it be the government,
the people, or the victims.1 1 3
4.

Limited Force and Duration

The amount of force must be narrowly tailored to remedy only human
rights violations, 1 4 and the intervention should be proportionate to the
abuse.11 5 This restriction, therefore, has two components: it must impact
only those who have caused the violation, and the force of the impact
must be in proportion to the harm being addressed.
5. Preference for Collective Action
Collective action represents one of the best means for establishing international law and justice. 116 The involvement of more than one state in
the intervention "tends . . . to depoliticize an otherwise highly violate
situation. 117 Although having more than one state involved does not per
se make the intervention legal, it better ensures the disinterested status of
an intervenor 1 1 8

112. Id. at 267-68.
113. Wright, supra note 96, at 458 (recognizing that an invitation from "the people"
would be difficult to obtain; determining the "majority voice" would also be hard).
114. TES6N, supra note 9, at 116. Many scholars support this criterion. See Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention, supra note 22, at 263; Bazyler, supra note 22, at
604; Reisman, supra note 25, at 187; THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 9, at 98.
115. TEs6N, supra note 9, at 116.
116. See, e.g., DE LIMA, supra note 1, at 218. The collective action principle
emerged in the United States mission in Somalia; U.N. peacekeepers eventually will replace United States troops. Nelan, supra note 103, at 27. The timing of the replacement
is uncertain, however, because the apparent lack of respect for U.N. forces counsels
against a quick withdrawal by the United States troops. See Keith B. Richburg, Somalis
Protest U.N. Visit: Faction Turns Away Secretary General, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1993,
at Al.
117. Fonteyne, supra note 20, at 205. Another scholar contests this point and criticizes the U.N.'s past efforts which have done little to ensure morality. Wright, supra
note 96, at 457.
118. Bazyler, supra note 22, at 602. While intervention does not gain legality
through collective action, the presence of more than one state decreases the chance that
an action is not based upon humanitarian motives. Id.; see also Doctrine of
HumanitarainIntervention, supra note 22, at 235; THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 9,
at 98 (stating that if an act is illegal when done by one, it is illegal when done by many);
Conference Proceedings, supra note 20, at 85; HODGES, supra note 9, at 91 (quoting
Oppenheim as supporting humanitarian intervention if it is "Collective intervention of
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6. Exhaustion of Other Remedies
Not all scholars who have attempted to define restrictions on the doctrine require the criterion of exhaustion of remedies. 119 Often they omit
this requirement on the assumption that the cost of intervention is simply
too high for a state to undertake without first considering other options.12 Others do not include it because some violations are so extreme
that less intrusive measures would not work and would even worsen the
situation.' 2 1
V.
A.

A NEW ERA

Events Preceding Change

In September 1991 President George Bush made a speech to the U.N.
praising international cooperation and aspiring to a "new world order." '22 He also spoke about protecting human rights and enforcing state
compliance with "standards of human decency."' 123 While he assured
that no state would "surrender one iota of its own sovereignty," the underlying message suggested a legitimation of humanitarian
24
intervention.
Other leaders in the international legal community have echoed Bush's
message. Then U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar said "[w]e have
reached a state in the ethical and psychological evolution of Western
Civilization in which the massive and deliberate violation of human
rights will not longer be tolerated."' 25 Additional support came from the
Soviet Foreign Minister, Boris Pankin, who declared "substantive dis-

the Powers").
119. Bazyler, supra note 22, at 606. "If the intervenor did not first utilize peaceful
procedures to effectuate its humanitarian ambition, but immediately jumped in with
force, it is less likely that its motives were predominately humanitarian." Id.
120. Wright, supra note 96, at 456.
121. Bazyler, supra note 22, at 606; see, e.g., Maass, supra note 6, at A13. A U.N.
aide said people in Sarajevo are dying at such a high rate from starvation and cold that
political action is needed in addition to humanitarian aid. Id.
122. See U.N. Address, supra note 3, at 1325.
123. Id. at 1327.
124. Id.; Leslie H. Gelb, Why the U.N. Dog Didn't Bark, N.Y TIMS, Sept. 25,
1991, at A23. Former President Bush's speech contained "a revolutionary message about
humanitarian intervention barely audible throughout the text, a message nonetheless
sensed by representatives of despots and democracies alike that frightened all with its
implications." Id.
125. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, As Borders Come Down, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1991, at
A27.
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cussion of specific human rights issues and matters of compliance with
international commitments in this area cannot any longer be dismissed
126
under the artificial pretext of interference in internal affairs."'
The U.N. response to recent events confirms that it intends to adopt a
policy of humanitarian intervention. For example, in December 1991, in
what has been described as an "unprecedented act of humanitarian intervention," the General Assembly condemned Iraq for its treatment of
its Kurdish population and insisted that it immediately allow humanitarian organizations access to its suffering people. 127 One year later,
United States troops entered Somalia with U.N. permission to deliver
much needed food. 2 ' Secretary General Boutros-Ghali described the
purpose of their mission as one that would "restore hope for the Somali
29
people."'

The change in the U.N.'s attitude has several sources. One is the unprecedented change in the world's political landscape.' 3 0 The trend is
toward government by a state's people, and individuals are demanding
respect for their rights and the rights of others. Another source of the
changed attitude is the inordinately high number of disasters in the past
two decades that have demanded humanitarian intervention. Over the
past twenty years, natural disasters killed three million people and left
eight hundred million homeless. 3 ' These figures, although shocking, do
32
not include the casualties of man-made disasters.'
The creation of hundreds of thousands of refugees is one of the largest
problems resulting from man-made disasters and internal conflicts and
may be another factor that has led the U.N. to reconsider its stance

126. Rajiv Tiwari, United Nations: Third World Resists Humanitarian Intervention, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 6, 1991 (addressing the United Nations General Assembly on the topic of the U.N. system's shortcomings in responding to humanitarian

crises).
127. See S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/688 (1991); Rosenfeld, supra note 125, at A27.
128. Lewis, supra note 8, at A17. "The soldiers are going into Somalia under their
own commanders and their own flags though only after the United States sought and
received formal permission to send them from the United Nations." Id.
129. Id. (reported as being part of Boutros-Ghali's message to the people of
Somalia).
130. Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Review of the Capacity, Experience and
Coordination Arrangements in the United Nations System for HumanitarianAssistance, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Items 84(a), 97(b), and 143, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/
46/568 (1991) [hereinafter Report on HumanitarianAssistance].
131. Paul Lewis, DisasterRelief Proposal Worries Third World, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
13, 1991, at A9.
132. Id.
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against humanitarian intervention.' 3 Wars following the collapse of governments will worsen the refugee problem. Governments such as those in
Yugoslavia and the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics have collapsed,
spawning ethnic conflict.' 4 A Note on International Protection that the
High Commissioner submitted to the United Nations General Assembly
addressed possible solutions to the refugee problem.' 3 5 To control and
assist refugees, the Commissioner suggested taking preventive action in-

side the affected states."3 6 The Note identifies refugees as one of the
problems that necessitate the development of "an effective emergencyresponse mechanism which would enable the international community to
respond immediately and decisively to humanitarian emergencies. "137
The instigation of a method of protection fosters two concerns: the rights
of individuals to leave their states and the necessary violation of sovereignty. 3 8 First, if actions actively encourage people to stay in their
homeland, their right to leave freely will be impaired. Second, in order to
improve the status within a state, U.N. members will have to enter the
state, even if not invited. The Note acknowledges the enhanced role of
the U.N. and cites the diminution of human rights violations as a chal3 9
lenge to growing global cooperation.
Under the "principles of international law, the humanitarian practices
of international organizations, the principle of humanity, and guarantees
of fundamental human rights," refugees have grounds for protection that
"should ideally permit an individual to assert a claim, not only against
his or her own country . . .but on the international community as a
whole-a claim to its direct involvement on humanitarian grounds."' 4
The international community is recognizing this need, and recent events
indicate movement in this direction.' 41 The Commissioner concludes that
"there might be value in examining how the legal foundations of this

133.

See supra note 4.

134. Note on InternationalProtection (submitted by the High Commissioner), U.N.
GAOR, 42nd Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/777 (1991) [hereinafter High Commissioner's Note].
135. Id. at 15.
136. Id. at 2. "Prevention in this context means the elimination of causes of departure-so that people will not feel compelled to leave-rather than the erection of barriers
which leave causes intact, but make departure impossible." Id. at 11.
137. Id. at 15. The report also discusses the plausibility of assistance within the
affected state or the creation therein of safety zones for refugees. Id. at 12.
138. Lewis, supra note 8, at A17.
139. High Commissioner'sNote, supra note 134, at 13. "The challenge today is to
... require States to eliminate violations of human rights in their territory." Id.
140. Id. at 15.
141. Id. at 16.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 26.341

development could be strengthened." '42 The need, therefore, for aid and
prompt assistance to refugees is congruent with, if not identical to, the
principle of intervention for the protection of human rights.
Other indications of the need for changing the structure of international law appear in the Secretary General's 1991 report entitled
"Programmes and Activities to Promote Peace in the World."143 In the

section entitled "Future Perspectives," the Secretary General recognized
that there has been a shift to a greater emphasis on issues such as human
rights and the fulfillment of basic human needs. 4 4 Current Secretary
General Boutros-Ghali appears to be attempting to implement his predecessor's ideas. In his report, "An Agenda for Peace," he recommends
preventive deployment of U.N. troops as well as use of force in
peacekeeping missions where conflict has already arisen. 4 5
B.

The United Nations Initiates Change

The Economic and Social Council drafted a report that includes the
recommendation of the European Council to improve emergency assistance by appointing a high level humanitarian aid coordinator.' 46 Citing
the U.N.'s unsatisfactory response to past catastrophes, 4 7 the report recognizes the need to improve the U.N.'s ability to provide aid efficiently.148 The Secretary General responded with a report to the General

142. Id.
143. Programs and Activities to Promote Peace in the World, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 22, U.N. Doc. A/46/549 (1991)
(describing certain programs and activities occurring throughout the world that are
designed to promote peace).
144. Id. at 8. "The primary change which can be perceived is a shift to broader
conceptions of components of peace and greater emphasis on issues such as human rights
and the environment." Id. at 8-9.
145. An Agenda for Peace, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 8-12, U.N. Doc. A/47/277
(1992); see also Weiss, supra note 69, at 58: "As efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Somalia, and Iraq illustrate, humanitarianism has made its appearance as the driving
rationale behind new international military forces. The precedent of humanitarian intervention is therefore critical in looking toward future U.N. military efforts. Id.; see also
Scheffer, supra note 39, at 275-86. This report, however, also speaks highly of state
sovereignty, and reconciling its ambitious changes with traditional notions of sovereignty
will be difficult. See Weiss, supra note 69, at 60.
146. Special Economic and DisasterRelief Assistance, Report of the Economic and
Social Council, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Annex, Agenda Items 12 and 85, at 2, U.N.
Doc. A/46/288 (1991).
147. Id. (noting a cyclone in Bangladesh, crisis in the Horn of Africa, and the massive exodus of Iraqi refugees).
148. Id. In the U.N. debate about an emergency coordinator, France described previ-
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Assembly on strengthening the coordination of humanitarian aid.149 His
report notes the recent escalation of disasters and the increased numbers
of refugees and displaced persons. 5 The Secretary General identifies
the basic goals of having sufficient and readily available resources and of
achieving better coordination among those organizations that provide
help. 5' The U.N. General Assembly found the most controversial element of the report to be the request for an appointment of a high level
coordinator.'"" Although the report indicates that the handling of emergencies15 3 would be the primary responsibility of the affected state,

54

it

also expresses an intent to provide greater authority for U.N.
intervention.' 5
The report recognizes that there must be a single emergency relief
coordinator which provides for the expedient and efficient delivery of aid
to victims of natural and man-made disasters.' 56 The U.N. has several
organizations that provide assistance in emergencies, but the agencies
tend to be poorly coordinated, ineffective, and their efforts often overlap. 5' The International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) more specifically set out the current problems plaguing the provision of aid.' 58 These
include the need for eliminating duplication of aid, for recipient states to
engage in long-term planning, and for eliminating any competition that

ous U.N. action as "fragmentary, case-by-case or blow-by-blow." U.N. GAOR, 46th
Sess., at 69, U.N. Doe. A/46/PV.39 (1991) [hereinafter Record of 39th Meeting]; see

also Maass, supra note 6, at A13 (describing the ineffectiveness of aid presently being
provided in Bosnia).
149. See Report on HumanitarianAssistance, supra note 130.
150. Id. at 2.
151. Id. The report contains recommendations for stand-by capacity, stockpiles of
relief support, teams of technical specialists for emergencies, etc. Id. at 2-7.
152. Id. at 6. Some of the duties of the coordinator are to draw upon the capacity of
existing operational organizations that provide humanitarian aid, to identify complex and
large scale emergencies that require system-wide response, to coordinate the response,
and to negotiate access by operational organizations to emergency areas with the consent
of concerned parties. Id. at 7.
153. Id. at 10.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 6. The report recommends appointment of a coordinator who would draw
upon resources of existing organizations in order to facilitate timely response to humanitarian emergency situations. Id.
156. Id.
157. The U.N. also often works with the International Committee of the Red Cross
and the International Organization for Migration, and the role of nongovernmental organizations is growing. Id. at 29-31.
158. U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 42d mtg., at 54, U.N. Doc. A/46/PV.42 [hereinafter
Record of 42d Meeting].
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might occur between existing humanitarian organizations.' 5 9
The members of the General Assembly generally support better coordination.16 0 Controversy surrounded the appointment of an emergency
relief coordinator as a means of accomplishing this goal, 6 ' however, and
62
the members disagreed about the scope of the coordinator's power.1
The controversey stems from the need for a coordinator strong enough to
act quickly to send aid when a need arises, yet without the power to act
wholly independently, which could result in sending aid to states where
intervention is inappropriate. 6 The potential for abusing this power is
of great concern to many state leaders.' 4
C.

Debate in the United Nations

The debate over the appointment of a powerful emergency relief coordinator was vehement.'6 5 Leading those opposed to this specific type of
coordination was Mr. Awoonor from Ghana speaking on behalf of a
group of 77.16

He expressed general support for the idea of making

response to disasters quick and effective but emphasized that respect for
sovereignty should not be sacrificed to meet this end. 6 7 He endorsed obtaining state consent prior to any interference as one of the "cornerstones
159.

Id. at 54-55.

160. See infra part IV.C.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 46th Sess., 51st mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/46/
SR.51 (1991). "The question of human rights should not be used to legitimize foreign
interference or political pressure; but should be dealt with on the basis of the principles
of neutrality, non-selectivity and objectivity." Id. (statement of Mr. Siddig from Sudan).
The new world order must be one that will "promote human rights, not selectively, but
rather universally, and be based on a genuine consensus, which applies the same rules to
everyone." U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., at 43, U.N. Doc. A/46/PV.21 (1991) [hereinafter

Record of 21st Meeting].
165. U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 41st mtg., U.N. Doc. A/46/PV.41 (1991) [hereinafter
Record of 41st Meeting]. For example, the delegate from China asserted that nations
would act self-servingly in the name of human rights. U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., at 50,
U.N. Doc. A/46/PV.8 (1991) [hereinafter Record of 8th Meeting]. Also, the delegate
from Ghana repudiated any claim that the resolution permitted uninvited intervention.
Evelyn Leopold, General Assembly Approves New Relief Aid Chief, REUTERS LIBR.
REP., Dec. 19, 1991.
166. Record of 41st Meeting, supra note 165, at 31 (statement of Mr. Awoonger of
Ghana). The group of 77 represents a 128 member group of developing states. Id.
167. Id. "The respect for sovereignty which the United Nations system enjoins is
not an idle stipulation that can be rejected outright in the name of even the noblest
gestures." Id. at 34-35 (statement of Mr. Mohammed of Iraq).
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in the democratic ideal itself."1 8 He also expressed concern over addressing the "root causes" of emergency situations rather than waiting
until the conditions within a state reach a level so egregious that intervention is warranted.' 9
Iraq's delegate also expressed opposition to the appointment of a highlevel coordinator.' 70 Iraq blames foreign intervention in its affairs for the
internal conflict among its ethnic groups and communities. x7 ' The Iraqi
delegate alleged that without the humanitarian component, the aid is
merely intervention for political purposes, which is in direct conflict with
the Charter."7 2
The delegate from Uruguay also raised the issue of defining what
level of emergency will warrant intervention. 17 He suggested that inter-

vention occur only "when the capacity of States is overwhelmed by the
scale of the events that the international community must raise the alert
and come to the aid of those affected."' 7 4 Despite his concerns, the Uruguayan delegate recognized that "the principle of non-intervention cannot stand as a protective barrier behind which the rights of peoples can

be disregarded." '

He concluded, therefore, that the international com-

munity may assist states in times of great emergency if that assistance
7
not compromise the principle of national sovereignty.1 1
India also expressed reservations about the proposed resolution and
raised questions of who would decide when to intervene and what form
the intervention would take.177 While India's delegate recognized the
need for more efficient relief efforts, 8 he asserted that "innovation calling for a reluctant abridgment of such sovereignty, must be strictly
avoided."' 79 He felt that the proposal placed too much of a political bur-

168.
169.

Id. at 36.
Id.

170. Record of 42d Meeting, supra note 158, at 48-50. "Humanitarian assistance
cannot be imposed by the donors or by any State. The beneficiary must a priori agree to
accept such assistance. Otherwise, it would be a case of coercion, which is incompatible
with the humanitarian concept of aid." Id. at 44-45 (statement of Mr. Mohammed of

Iraq).
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
"even if

Id. at 46.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Record of 41st Meeting, supra note 165, at 18.
Id.
Id. The delegate also declared that national sovereignty should not be diluted
the stakes are high." Id.
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den on humanitarian agencies. 8 0
Other dissenters included Egypt, Chile, China, Cuba, and the Syrian
Arab Republic. 18' These states expressed the view that the members
should consider other options for improving the current system.' 82 They
claimed the proposal, which would allow intervention without invitation,
was in violation of the principles of the U.N. Charter, 8 ' and they were
particularly concerned about potential abuse.' 4
Support for the appointment of a high-level emergency relief coordinator was as emphatic as the dissent. Arguments in support of the proposal centered on the extreme need for a coordinator.185 The supporters
of the proposal repudiated the claim that the coordinator would impinge
upon sovereignty. 8 As the delegate from the Netherlands said, "[tlhe
fact that human dignity was denied and suffering tolerated too long
without effective and timely action shows that there is an urgent need to
deal with the problems and shortcomings in the delivery of emergency
aid."'' 87 The Brazilian delegate bolstered this argument by asserting that
even when states disagree on all other matters, they should still agree
that the "wounded must be assisted, that the sick must receive adequate
care, that suffering must be relieved."'8 8
The Norwegian delegate expressed the concern that political motives
often prevent help from reaching suffering people.' 8 9 Thus, there must
be a fundamental change in attitude toward the behavior that allows
such deprivation to occur.' 9 ' France's delegate asserted that a strong coordinator would necessarily lead to an encroachment upon sovereignty.' 9 ' The French delegate explained that humanitarian action must

180. Id. at 19-20. "To expect [humanitarian bodies] to address the political aspects
would only be overburdening them, making their mandates controversial and unworkable: in a word, hamstringing them with extraneous responsibilities". Id. at 20.
181. Record of 42d Meeting, supra note 158, at 31, 36, 42; Record of 39th Meeting,
supra note 148, at 43.
182. E.g., Record of 42d Meeting, supra note 158, at 36 (Cuba's delegate suggested
a need for some type of coordinating entity).
183. Record of 39th Meeting, supra note 148, at 51.
184. Record of 42d Meeting, supra note 158, at 42.
185. Id. Supporters asserted that swift action is essential to saving lives and preventing irreversible destruction. Id. at 51.
186. The delegate from Chile noted, however, that "it is up to the government affected to define the type of assistance required." Id.
187. Record of 39th Meeting, supra note 148, at 12.
188. Id. at 51.
189. Id. at 9-10.
190. Id.

191.

Id. at 72. "Humanitarian" action respects sovereignty and state authority. It can
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respect sovereignty,' 9 2 which suggests that intervention requires the consent of the sovereign. He went on to assert that the principle of "subsidiary function" should be considered the premise for international humanitarian aid.19 This principle holds that the states in the general region of
the affected territory have the primary role of providing humanitarian
assistance, and action should never be taken unilaterally."" The affected

state has the primary responsibility for aiding its people and, therefore,
has the responsibility of initiating and supervising the receipt of aid.
Other delegates reiterated that the coordinator will not in any way
jeopardize sovereignty. As the delegate from Canada said, sovereignty is
still guaranteed under the Charter. 9 5 Furthermore, in discussing the
"right" '96 to assistance, the representative from the ICRC stated that
far from infringing upon the sovereignty of states, humanitarian assistance
in armed conflicts as provided for by international law is, rather, an expression of the sovereignty. While states have an obligation to facilitate
assistance when the urgency of the needs makes assistance necessary,...
the task of the humanitarian organization is to guarantee the impartial
1 97

nature of the assistance.

The plan may, however, require initiation before such guarantees can be
made. As the delegate from the U.S.S.R. suggested, "acceptable princi-

ples, criteria, and forms of response" that are within the accepted limits
of the U.N. Charter will develop over time.' 98
The United States expressed its support for the proposed resolution' 9 9

but avoided specifically addressing the concerns of the dissenters."' The
United States delegate asserted the need not only to address existing

in no way be used to intervene in affairs that are essentially under the authority of the
nation." Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. (citing resolutions 43/131 and 45/100 which state that the territorial states
have the "primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination and implementation
of humanitarian assistance within their respective territories").
194. Id.
195. Record of 41st Meeting, supra note 165, at 13.
196. This right to assistance is "often not known, ignored or misinterpreted." Record
of 42d Meeting, supra note 158, at 60.
197. Id. Whether or not the aid would be provided without a political price was aiso
an issue. The delegate from China raised concerns about states acting self-servingly and
imposing states' own beliefs on others under the guise of humanitarian assistance. Record
of 8th Meeting, supra note 165, at 50.
198. Record of 39th Meeting, supra note 148, at 31.
199. Record of 41st Meeting, supra note 165, at 51.
200. Id. at 53.
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problems, but also to seize the opportunity for change.2 '
The contents of this debate typify the concerns that surround placing a
significant amount of power in the hands of a single individual. The
debate also demonstrates the gravity of any issue related to sovereignty.
The smaller member states in particular ar&extremely wary of the creation of a strong international body with armies to serve under it.2 °2

D. A Battle for Human Rights is Won
Despite serious concerns and reservations, U.N. members passed the
resolution providing for the appointment of a High-Level Emergency
Relief Coordinator in December 1991.203 The resolution states that "the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of states must be fully
respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. ' 204
However, it allows for humanitarian assistance "with the consent of the
affected country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country."2 5 The wording provides the Coordinator with a significant amount of discretion when making a decision whether or not to
intervene.
The clause that dictates respect for sovereignty does not give absolute
deference to the state. It instead qualifies the restraint as being in accordance with the Charter.2 °6 If in this new era the Charter's relaxed interpretation allows limited forms of intervention for humanitarian causes,
then it will not be a violation of sovereignty for the Coordinator to allocate aid with only minimal consent.20 7
Furthermore, there is significance in the choice of the term "country"
instead of "government" or "state." This choice allows the people of a
"country" to offer their consent to intervention.20 8 Furthermore, the
phrase "in principle on the basis of an appeal" is sufficiently vague to
permit the Coordinator significant discretion. The effectiveness of the
new position will depend upon who is appointed and what reaction the
international community has to the coordinator's authority.

201.

Id.

202. See id. The delegates from Pakistan, France, and Ghana spoke of their concern
for sovereignty. Id. at 64, 34-35, 24.

203.

"Supremo" Post, supra note 79.

204.

Id.

205.

Id.

206.
of states
207.
208.

Id. "The resolution says 'the sovereignty' territorial integrity and national unity
must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the U.N." Id.
Id.; Scheffer, supra note 39, at 281.
See Scheffer, supra note 39, at 281.
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VI.

CONCLUSION: THE UNITED STATES ROLE IN A UNITED
NATIONS THAT ACCEPTS THE VALIDITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION

After debate over the sanctity of sovereignty, the U.N. authorized the
United States armed intervention in famine-stricken Somalia.20 9 The Security Council did not obtain any form of consent 210 and even suspended
21 1
the rule that prevents U.N. peacekeepers from firing until fired upon.
It has become apparent to the members of the U.N. that it is nearly
impossible to provide meaningful humanitarian aid without some use of
force.212
One international law scholar stated that the success of increased
human rights intervention will depend upon those who lead the actions.21 3 If the leaders are "progressive and genuinely committed to their
own society and the human rights," then actions that they take outside of
their own state to benefit mankind are more credible. 2 4 As the doctrine
of humanitarian intervention gains legitimacy, the United States will undoubtedly take a leading role in the maintenance of international order.2" 5 Currently the U.N. needs the resources of the United States to
embark on any major military operation. 2 16 To date, when the United
States has commited its forces, it has also insisted on leading them. 217 As
a result, the intervention occurs primarily in the name of the United

States.218 Funding is yet another problem. The United Nations funds are
limited; therefore, the United States must finance any actions it takes on
behalf of the United Nations. 219 Consequently, there is concern that the
209. Lewis, supra note 8, at A17 (reporting that United States troops went into
Somalia with the permission of the U.N.).
210. Id.
211. Nelan, supra note 103, at 28.
212. Michael Ignatieff, Intervention on the Side of Oppressed Legacy of 1992, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Jan. 5, 1993, at A7.
213. Conference Proceedings, supra note 20, at 76.
214. Id.
215. Max Boot, U.S. Foreign Policy Plate is Full, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan.
5, 1993, at 1.
216. Nelan, supra note 103, at 28. Former President Bush said, when reporting on
the intervention in Somalia, that outside troops were necessary and only the United
States was capable of providing them. Id.
217. Leslie H. Gelb, The U.N. Chiefs Dilemma: Must U.S. Help Mean U.S. Control?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1992, at A13.
218. Id.
219. Lewis, supra note 8, at A17. "[W]ith its most recent intervention in Bosnia, the
United Nations has been forced to acknowledge its own bankruptcy again by saying that
it cannot pay anything toward the cost of an operation carried out in its name and that
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United States appears to command more respect than the U.N.220
An issue for the United States is whether it wants the obligation of
policing the world. The United States proved in Somalia it can easily
move into a small state, secure it, and provide aid without losing many
soldiers, 2 21 but not all areas that are in dire need of help will capitulate
so easily. 222 Military success is a necessary if humanitarian intervention
on behalf of human rights is to become acceptable; therefore, it is vital
that the United States not undertake an action where success is
questionable.223
Because of the complexity of the internal disputes involving human
rights violations and the need for the support of the international community, the United States must remain a strong supporter of the U.N.
while avoiding the image that it is dominating the organization. 224 This
will be difficult because the U.N. depends heavily upon the United
States to perform many of its miltiary functions. 2 Similarly, to lend
credibility to the U.N., the United States must relinquish control of some
military operations to the U.N.2 28
Traditional international law doctrines must be revisited and revised
in light of modern ideals and technology.22 7 The possibilities today are

participating countries must bear the cost of sending in their troops." Id.
220. While there was general mistrust of United Nations intentions in Somalia, once
the United States soldiers arrived the warlords came together for discussions. Richburg,
supra note 116, at Al.
221. Talbott, supra note 41, at 35. "Weak countries allow you to be daring, because
the risks are lower." Nelan, supra note 103, at 29.
222. Nelan, supra note 103, at 29.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 29; Watt, supra note 30, at 12.
225. Gideon Rose, A Balkan Vietnam, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1993, at A15 (comparing Bosnia to Vietnam).
226. "Just as the United States doesn't like others to take charge, other countries also
don't like the United States to play a dominant role in the United Nations." Gelb, supra
note 217, at A13 (quoting U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali).
227. Reisman, supra note 25, at 195.
The validity of humanitarian intervention is not based upon the nation-stateoriented theories of international law; these theories are little more than two centuries old. It is based upon an antinomic but equally vigorous principle, deriving
from a long tradition of natural law and secular values: the kinship and minimum
reciprocal responsibilities of all humanity, the inability of geographical boundaries
to stem categorical moral imperatives, and ultimately, the confirmation of the sanctity of human life, without reference to place or transient circumstances.
Id.; see also STOWELL, supra note 9, at 59-62. Reisman continues:
But why, we may ask, should the independence of a state be more sacred than the
law which gives it that independence? Why adopt a system which makes it neces-
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far beyond those conceived when the decision was made that states must
be free from outside interference to develop and discover for themselves
what an appropriate form of government should be. Historically, there
have been compelling reasons for such a position; however, the time has
come to hold the rights of individuals above the rights of states and permit intervention when too many lives are being sacrificed for political
ideas.
Christine Ellerman

sary to gloss over constant violations of the very principles which are declared to
be most worthy of respect from all? If, where such intolerable abuses do occur, it
be excusable to violate at one and the same time the independence of a neighbor
and the law of nations, can such a precedent of disrespect for law prove less dangerous to international security than the recognition of the right, when circumstances justify, to ignore that independence which is the ordinary rule of state life?
Reisman, supra note 25, at 125.

